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Abstract- IP spoofing is a attack in which attacker launch the attack by using forged source IP address. It 
is long known attackers may use forged source IP address to conceal their real locations. To capture the 
spoofers, a number of IP traceback mechanisms have been proposed. However, due to the challenges of 
deployment, there has been not a widely adopted IP traceback solution, at least at the Internet level. As a 
result, the mist on the locations of spoofers has never been dissipated till now. Here it proposes passive IP 
traceback (PIT) that bypasses the deployment difficulties of IP traceback techniques. PIT investigates 
Internet Control Message Protocol error messages (named path backscatter) triggered by spoofing traf-
fic, and tracks the spoofers based on public available information (e.g., topology). In this way, PIT can 
find the spoofers without any deployment requirement. Here it illustrates the causes, collection, and the 
statistical results on path backscatter, demonstrates the processes and effectiveness of PIT, and shows the 
captured locations of spoofers through applying PIT on the path backscatter data set. These results can 
help further reveal IP spoofing, which has been studied for long but never well understood.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
IP Spoofing, which means attackers launching at-
tacks with forged source IP  addresses, has been 
recognized as a serious security problem on the 
Internet for long [1]. By using addresses that are 
assigned to others or not assigned at all, attackers 
can avoid exposing their real locations, or enhance 
the effect of attacking, or launch reflection based 
attacks. A number of notorious attacks rely on IP 
spoofing, including SYN flooding, SMURF, DNS 
amplification etc. A DNS amplification attack 
which severely degrads the service of a Top Level 
Domain (TLD) name server is reported in [2]. 
Though there has been a popular conventional wis-
dom that DoS attacks are launched from botnets 
and spoofing is no longer critical, the report of 
ARBOR on NANOG 50th meeting shows spoofing 
is still significant in observed DoS attacks [3]. In-
deed, based on the captured backscatter messages 
from UCSD Network Telescopes, spoofing activi-
ties are still frequently observed [4].  
To capture the origins of IP spoofing traffic is of 
great importance. As long as the real locations of 
spoofers are not disclosed, they cannot be deterred 
from launching further attacks[5]. Even just ap-
proaching the spoofers, for example, determining 
the ASes or networks they reside in, attackers can 
be located in a smaller area, and filters can be 
placed closer to the attacker before attacking traffic 
get aggregated. The last but not the least, identify-
ing the origins of spoofing traffic can help build a 
reputation system for ASes, which would be help-
ful to push the corresponding ISPs to verify IP 
source address. 
Routers may fail to forward an IP spoofing packet 
due to various reasons, e.g., TTL exceeding[6]. In 
such cases, the routers may generate an ICMP error 
message (named path backscatter) and send the 
message to the spoofed source address. Because the 
routers can be close to the spoofers, the path 
backscatter messages may potentially disclose the 
locations of the spoofers. PIT exploits these path 
backscatter messages to find the location of the 
spoofers. With the locations of the spoofers known, 
the victim can seek help from the corresponding 
ISP to filter out the attacking packets, or take other 
counterattacks. PIT is especially useful for the vic-
tims in reflection based spoofing attacks, e.g., DNS 
amplification attacks. The victims can find the lo-
cations of the spoofers directly from the attacking 
traffic. Not all the packets reach their destina-
tions[7]. A network device may fail to forward a 
packet due to various reasons. Under certain condi-
tions, it may generate an ICMP error message, i.e., 
path backscatter messages. The path backscatter 
messages will be sent to the source IP address indi-
cated in the original packet. If the source address is 
forged, the messages will be sent to the node who 
actually owns the address. This means the victims 
of reflection based attacks, and the hosts whose 
addresses are used by spoofers, are possibly to col-
lect such messages.  
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Fig1. Architecture of PIT (Passive IP Traceback) 
The above diagram shows the way application 
works, here first attacker will uses the source IP 
address of IP packet  during this period of time path 
back scatter messeges are sent to the victim node 
initially . after some transmission between victim 
and destination,IP spoofers are detected with the 
help of passive IP traceback. 
II. LITERATURE SURVEY 
Literature survey is the most important step in 
software development process. Before improving 
the tools it is compulsory to decide the economy 
strength, time factor. Once the programmer‘s create 
the structure tools as programmer require a lot of 
external support, this type of support can be done 
by senior programmers, from websites or from 
books. 
A. Security problems in the TCP/IP protocol suite 
(Author:   S. M. Bellovin) 
S. M. Bellovin has explained The TCP/IP protocol 
suite, which is very widely used today, was devel-
oped under the sponsorship of the Department of 
Defense. Despite that, there are a number of serious 
security flaws inherent in the protocols, regardless 
of the correctness of any implementations. Here the 
author describe a variety of attacks based on these 
flaws, including sequence number spoofing, rout-
ing attacks, source address spoofing, and authenti-
cation attacks and also present defenses against 
these attacks[9]. 
B. Distributed denial of service (DDOS) attacks 
(author: Felix Lau Simon) 
Felix Lau Simon has discussed about distributed 
denial of service attacks in the Internet. The has 
decribed attacks on Yahoo!, Amazon.com, 
CNN.com, and other major Web sites. A denial of 
service is characterized by an explicit attempt by an 
attacker to prevent legitimate users from using re-
sources. An attacker may attempt to: “flood” a 
network and thus reduce a legitimate user’s band-
width, prevent access to a service, or disrupt ser-
vice to a specific system or a user. Some methods 
and techniques used in denial of service attacks, 
and provides the list of possible defenses. The 
study of  distributed denial of service attack can be 
done by using ns-2 network simulator.The algo-
rithms are implemented in a network router to per-
form during an attack, and whether legitimate users 
can obtain desired bandwidth[8].  
C. Practical network support for IP traceback 
(Authors: S. Savage, D. Wetherall, A. Karlin and 
T. Anderson)  
S. Savage described a technique for tracing anon-
ymous packet flooding attacks in the Internet back 
towards their source. This is motivated by the in-
creased frequency and sophistication of denial-of-
service attacks and by the difficulty in tracing 
packets with incorrect, or “spoofed”, source ad-
dresses [10]. Here author describe a general pur-
pose traceback mechanism based on probabilistic 
packet marking in the network. The approach al-
lows a victim to identify the network path(s) trav-
ersed by attack traffic without requiring interactive 
operational support from Internet Service Providers 
(ISPs). Moreover, this traceback can be performed 
“post-mortem” – after an attack has completed.The 
implementation of this technology that is incremen-
tally deployable, (mostly) backwards compatible 
and can be efficiently implemented using conven-
tional technology [21]. 
III. METHODOLOGY 
A. Mathematical Model 
Basic Tracking Mechanism Whenever a path 
backscatter message whose source is router r 
(named reflector) and the original destination is od 
is captured, the most direct inference is that the 
packet from attacker to od should bypass r.Use a 
very simple mechanism in spoofing origin tracking. 
The network is abstracted as a graph G(V, E), 
where V is the set of all the network nodes and E is 
the set of all the links. A network node can be a 
router or an AS, depending on the tracking scenar-
io. From each path backscatter message, the node 
r,r ∈ V which generates the packet and the original 
destination od, od ∈ V of the spoofing packet can 
be got. Denote the location of the spoofer, i.e., the 
nearest router or the origin AS, by a, a ∈ V[14]. We 
make use of path information to help track the loca-
tion of the spoofer [11]. Use path (v, u) to denote 
the sequence of nodes on one of the path from v to 
u, and use PAT H(v, u) to denote the set of all the 
paths from v to u. Use ϕ(r, od) to denote the set of 
nodes from each of which a packet to od can by-
pass  r, i.e  
             ∈                      ∈
PATH(v,od) ϕ(r, od) actually determines the min-
imal set which must contain the spoofer. We name 
the result set of ϕ(r, od) by suspect set.If the topol-
ogy and routes of the network are known, this 
mechanism can be used to effectively determine the 
suspect set. For example, an ISP can make this 
model to locate spoofers in its managed network 
[12]. However, for most cases, the one who per-
forms tracing does not know the routing choices of 
the other networks, which are non-public infor-
mation. Moreover, the topologies of most of the 
ASes are unknown to the public [13]. 
Another way to explaine about this project can be 
done with the help of UML (Unified Modified 
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Languege) diagram. Figure 2(Fig1) shows UML 
diagram, provides the graphical representation of 
functionality which are perfoming in this project. 
 
Fig2.UML diagram of PIT 
B. Enhancement Model 
In order to further enhance the security against the 
spoofing attacks here accusation method is intro-
duced. 
In that, if new node approaches the CA to join, the 
node should provide the revoked key to the new 
CA. The new CA would compare the key with pre-
vious cluster head. The new CA accepts the new 
node if only the key is verified. It further prevents 
the malicious node to join with the new cluster, 
even after the node detected as malicious.  
Since the network has mobility, sensor nodes can 
move from one cluster to another. The key of the 
sensor must be updated at each cluster. The old key 
provided by the previous CA must be revoked and 
new key should be generated by the current CA 
[15].  
Suppose if a node is found as malicious, then the 
key should be revoked. The malicious node can 
move into new cluster to get new keys. The CA had 
no chance to know that the coming node is mali-
cious. If the new CA provides the key to the mali-
cious node, then it can participate to the communi-
cation. There is no method to know the status of the 
new node [25].  
IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Detecting IP spoofers by using PIT (passive IP 
Traceback) can be evalueated through graph. 
 
Fig3. End -To –End Delay 
Red line show proposed system and green line is 
for existing system. 
Figure 3 shows the end to end delay for both exist-
ing and proposed system. Delay after applying PIT 
is less in proposed system as compard to existing 
system. 
Figure 4. Shows overall performance of the pro-
posed system. 
 
Fig4. CumulativeFraction 
 
Fig5.Throughput 
Figure 5. Shows throughput for existing and pro-
posed system. Throughput is more in proposed 
system than in existing system. 
 
Fig 6. Number Of Bytes Recieved 
Figure 6 shows number of bytes recieved in pro-
posed system is more than the existing system. In 
above graph the No.of bytes recieved is more in 
proposed system this is achieved by PIT (Passsive 
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IP Traceback) . 
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE SCOPE 
Here the attempt is try to find the locations of 
spoofers based on investigating the path backscat-
ter messages. In this article, the Passive IP 
Traceback (PIT) which tracks spoofers based on 
path backscatter messages and public available 
information.The illustration will provide causes, 
collection, and statistical results on path backscat-
ter. Here the method is present that how to apply 
PIT when the topology and routing are either 
known, or the routing is unknown, or neither of 
them are known. 
In future work we can extend this to include more 
power full cryptographic technique. 
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